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TRITHEISM AND THE TRINITY 
C. Stephen Layman 
This paper is a reflection on two ontological analogies that have played a role in discussion 
about the Trinity~the Modalist and Social analogies. I argue that the Modal analogy 
commits one to a view of the divine persons that comports poorly with Scripture. I then 
consider two arguments to the effect that the doctrine of the Trinity commits one to 
tritheism. I argue that the Social analogy contains better resources for handling these 
arguments than the more traditional position, which involves denying that the divine 
persons are substances. 
According to the doctrine of the Trinity, there is exactly one God but three divine 
persons. Nowadays this doctrine is regarded as a classic example of the absurd 
lengths to which metaphysics can go. In this paper I provide an interpretation of 
the doctrine which is not absurd, i.e., not logically incoherent. 
My discussion focuses on two ontological analogies naturally employed in 
thinking about the Trinity-the Modalist and Social analogies. I argue that the 
Modalist analogy, though coherent, comports poorly with Scripture. I then con-
sider two arguments to the effect that the doctrine of the Trinity commits one to 
tritheism. I attempt to show that the Social Trinitarian has better ways of handling 
these arguments than his more traditional counterpart, who denies that the divine 
persons are substances. 
I. Some Key Terms 
If we are to discover whether the doctrine of the Trinity is coherent, we must get 
clear about the basic terms employed in formulating it. In this paper I shall assume 
that x is God if and only if x is the Supreme Being. 'Supreme' here could be taken in 
two senses: (l)'x is the Supreme Being' might be taken to mean 'x is the most per-
fect being' or 'x is the most perfect being possible.' I call this the ontological sense 
of 'Supreme.' (2) There is also a monarchial sense of 'Supreme,' in which 'x is the 
Supreme Being' means 'x is the being who rules all others, the Lord of all.' No 
doubt there are important logical relations between these two senses of' Supreme.' 
But we need not explore these for present purposes. I hold that it is the monarchial 
sense of 'Supreme' that is of fundamental importance for Trinitarian debate. The 
reasons for this will become clear in part III. 
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According to the doctrine of the Trinity, there are three divine persons. What 
does 'person' mean in this context? It is well known that the word entered 
Christian theology via the Latin word 'persona,' which originally meant 'mask.' 
An actor might take more than one role in a play, with a distinct mask corre-
sponding to each role. Similarly, God might display more than one role or aspect 
in relating to human beings (or to Himself)-a Paternal aspect or Son-like aspect, 
for example. (I'll stick with the word 'persona' to indicate this first sense of 
'person. ') 
But there is another way to interpret the word 'person.' A person (in this 
second sense) is a thing capable of feeling, thinking, willing, and acting-a 
thing capable of conative and cognitive states. Let me stipulate that in this second 
sense of the term, 'x is a person' does not necessarily imply that 'x has a body.' 
E.g., if there are any demons or angels, they would count as persons in this 
second sense. (1'11 use the word 'self' to indicate this second sense of the term 
'person,' leaving 'person' itself ambiguous between 'persona' and 'self.') As 
we shall see momentarily, the two meanings of 'person' correspond to two 
analogies which are important for Trinitarian debate. 
We shall also need to get clear about the meaning of the word 'divine.' This 
demand will be met as the two Trinitarian analogies are developed. 
II. The Modalist Analogy 
On the Modalist view, God, the Supreme Being, is identical with exactly one 
self, but this self has three personae. From this perspective, 'x is a divine person' 
simply means 'x is a persona of the Supreme Being.' 
The Modalist view seems coherent. It is obvious that a single self can take 
on more than one role or aspect. E.g., one human being may be a husband and 
a father. He may even exhibit more than one of these roles at the same time, 
e.g., by being a "good family man." Thus, the problem with this view is not 
that it is incoherent. Rather, the problem lies in its inability to do justice to the 
Scriptures. Unless one assumes that the New Testament is in some sense a 
revelation from God, one has no "Trinitarian data" to theorize about. For it is 
the view presented of the Father, of Jesus (the Son), and of the Holy Spirit in 
the Scriptures that gives rise to the puzzles which Trinitarian theory seeks to 
resolve. 
Most Christians think the New Testament says or implies that Jesus is worthy 
of worship (and hence that He has the same ontological status as the Father). 
But the New Testament strongly suggests that Jesus is a distinct self from the 
Father. At least two aspects of the gospel record indicate this. First, Jesus is 
frequently represented as praying-{;arrying on a conversation with the Father. 
This strongly suggests that Jesus is a distinct self from the Father, and hence 
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that the Son is a distinct self from the Father-if one accepts the intuitively 
plausible and orthodox doctrine that Jesus is/was just one self. It seems ridiculous 
to view the prayers of Jesus as cases of someone talking to himself. Nor can 
these biblical passages be explained away by appealing to an alleged distinction 
between Jesus' human consciousness and His divine consciousness. For in one 
place Jesus says, " ... now, Father, glorify thou me in thy own presence with 
the glory which I had with thee before the world was made" (John 17:5).1 This 
surely implies that the Son existed prior to the incarnation. And most Christians 
would also take the verse to imply that the Son has always existed. 2 So, it appears 
that there have always been at least two divine selves. (Of course, the traditional 
doctrine says that there are three divine persons. I shall take it for granted that 
the Scriptures say or imply this, without discussing the relevant texts.) 
Second, Jesus frequently speaks of the Father in ways that make it most 
unnatural to suppose that He is speaking of Himself. For example, He is reported 
to have asked, "Did you not know that I must be in my Father's house?" (Luke 
2:49); and to have said, "All things have been delivered to me by my Father" 
(Matthew 11:27). Or again, with regard to the final judgment, Jesus is reported 
to have said, "But of that day or that hour no one knows, not even the angels 
in heaven, nor the Son, but only the Father" (Mark 13:32). The Modalist would 
have to take this last verse to be saying that a single self, God, knows something 
in one of His personae that He does not know in another. And this would imply 
that God is lacking an important form of self-knowledge. 
So, I am inclined to think that Modalism can be reconciled to the New Testament 
only by an unreasonable distortion of the texts. Hence, I tum to an examination 
of the Social analogy. 
Ill. The Social Analogy 
On this view, there is exactly one Supreme Being, but there are three divine 
selves. God is identical with the three divine selves in a special relationship. In 
other words, on this view, God is a social entity, analogous (ontologically) to 
a marriage. 'Divine' here means 'worthy of worship.' 
It seems obvious that the Social analogy comports well with the Scriptural 
themes I emphasized in criticizing Modalism. But it has often been alleged that 
the Social analogy commits one to tritheism, and hence that it is insufficiently 
sensitive to the "monotheistic" biblical texts. Can tritheism be avoided if we say 
that there are three divine selves? 
A. The Argument From Worthiness of Worship 
Consider the following argument: 
(1) The Father is worthy of worship, the Son is worthy of worship, 
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and the Holy Spirit is worthy of worship. (Premise) 
(2) The Father is a distinct self from the Son, the Father is a distinct 
self from the Holy Spirit, and the Son is a distinct self from the Holy 
Spirit. (Premise) 
So, (3) There are three selves worthy of worship. (from 1 and 3) 
(4) For any x, if x is worthy of worship, then x is God. (Premise) 
So, (5) There are three Gods. (from 3 and 4) 
Before criticizing this argument, it is important to ask: Why should a Christian 
resist the claim that there are three Gods? What is alarming or disconcerting 
about tritheism? I think the fear of polytheism is the fear of divided allegiance. 
"Hear, 0 Israel: the Lord our God is one Lord" (Deuteronomy 6:4). There is, 
on the biblical view, but one Lord of the universe. Polytheism suggests a universe 
containing various gods demanding incompatible actions or lifestyles of human 
beings. Or at least polytheism calls to mind a state of affairs in which a variety 
of gods are vying (jealously) for human devotion. For example, by praising 
Aphrodite above Hera, Paris brought Hera's wrath upon himself. If these are 
indeed the root reasons for preferring monotheism to polytheism, then, even if 
Trinitarianism is tritheism, it is doubtful that these reasons provide a ground for 
preferring monotheism to Trinitarianism. For the members of the Trinity do not 
vie for attention or disagree about matters of policy. 
More importantly, however, these observations about polytheism indicate what 
Trinitarians are apt to be insisting on when they say there is only one God. They 
mean that there is only one Lord of all. Social Trinitarians will deny that there 
are three Lords of the universe, even though there are three divine selves. For 
it is the community of divine persons that has ultimate authority. 
With these observations in mind, let us examine the above argument. It certainly 
seems valid, so we must inquire into the truth value ofthe premises. Traditionally, 
Trinitarians have rejected premise (4). That is, they do not license an inference 
from "x is worthy of worship" to "x is God" (where 'God' means 'the Supreme 
Substance'). Such an inference can be endorsed only if the range of the quantifier 
is restricted to substances. Hence, Trinitarians have traditionally rejected (4) in 
favor of 
(4*) For any substance x, if x is worthy of worship, then x is God. 
The next move is the puzzling one. 3 For this revision of (4) will enable us to 
avoid tritheism only if we are free to deny that the divine selves are substances. 
The traditional Trinitarian does deny that the divine selves are distinct substances. 
But the claim that the divine selves are not distinct substances is quite mysterious, 
since human selves are paradigmatic substances. And to appeal to mystery in 
this way is no more than to say, "I reject the inference from (3) and (4*) to (5) 
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but I don't see how it can fail." That is plainly a philosophical embarrassment. 
It just isn't adequate to speak of mysteries in this way when one is confronted 
with such a clear and forceful objection. 
By way of contrast, the Social Trinitarian offers us a criticism of (4) that does 
not involve an appeal to mystery. The Social view will not license inferences 
from "x is worthy of worship" to "x is God." For the Father is worthy of worship, 
but He isn't the community of divine selves. And hence, He is not (strictly 
speaking) God. The same goes, of course, for the Son and the Holy Spirit. This 
move is straightforward and doesn't commit us to any incomprehensible claims 
about the nature of selves. It is true that on this view God is not a substance. 
But it doesn't follow that God is an abstract entity. Rather, God is the divine 
persons in a special relationship. As such God belongs to the general metaphysical 
category of persons-in-relationship, i.e., social entities. It is natural to suppose 
that such entities are metaphysically composite, the components being persons 
and relationships. 
Someone might object: "On the Social view one cannot say, e.g., that the 
Father is God, since the Father is not a community. But don't the creeds say 
that the Father is God, the Son is God, etc.?" Yes, these words are used. The 
question is, "What do they mean?" The Social Trinitarian takes them to mean 
that the Father is divine, the Son is divine, etc. In other words, he understands 
the creeds to be saying that each of the divine persons is worthy of worship, 
and hence that they all have the same ontological status. This interpretation of 
the creeds certainly seems reasonable. Similarly, Christians say that Jesus is 
Lord, the Father is Lord, etc., and yet there are not three Lords. It seems 
reasonable to construe these utterances as asserting that each divine self is a 
member of the social entity that alone rules the cosmos. 
Even if my remarks about the argument from worthiness of worship are accept-
able, convinced monotheists may yet feel uneasy. There are other puzzles for 
the Social Trinitarian to solve. 
B. The Argument From Divine Attributes 
Consider: 
(i) If x is divine, then x is worthy of worship. (Premise) 
Oi) If x is worthy of worship, then x is all-powerful, all-knowing, and 
all-good (triple-A, for short). (Premise) 
(iii) There are three distinct divine selves. (Premise) 
So, (iv) There are three distinct selves who are each triple-A. (from i, ii, 
and iii) 
(v) If x is triple-A, then x is God. (Premise) 
So, (vi) There are three distinct selves who are each God. (from iv and v) 
Here again the argument seems valid. And the conclusion is unacceptable to the 
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Social Trinitarian, assuming 'God' means 'the Supreme Being' (in the monarchial 
sense). For, according to the Social Trinitarian, (vi) expresses a logical impos-
sibility, since it implies that a single self can be a community. 
The more traditional Trinitarian accepts (vi). He claims that there is only one 
Supreme Being because there is only one divine substance-even though there 
are three divine selves. So, once again the traditional Trinitarian makes the 
incomprehensible claim that three selves are not three substances. And once 
again we are left with no reason worthy of the name for thinking that the 
Trinitarian is not a tritheist. By way of contrast, the Social Trinitarian can offer 
clear reasons for rejecting at least one of premises (ii) or (v). 
Consider (v). Let's first clear away some irrelevancies. Someone might doubt 
(v) because the antecedent doesn't say that x possesses the divine attributes 
essentially, or because it doesn't say that x is a necessary being, or because it 
doesn't say that x is uncreated, etc. This is not relevant. You may amplify the 
antecedent of (v) as you wish (and alter (iv) accordingly), provided that you 
don't pack in anything that implies "x is a community of divine selves." 
With this clarification in mind, I think we can see that a Social Trinitarian 
might deny (v) without inconsistency. For he might hold that each of the divine 
selves is triple-A, and yet that none of them is, strictly speaking, God. For none 
of them is the Supreme Being, the Community of divine selves. Each of them 
is an uncreated self worthy of worship--but it is the Community of divine selves 
that is Lord-not any of the individual divine selves. Once again this move is 
straightforward and does not commit us to an appeal to mystery. 
The conceptual tools of the Social Trinitarian are also powerful enough to 
dismantle the first part of the "Argument from Divine Attributes." In particular, 
the Social Trinitarian can raise doubts about premise (ii): If x is worthy of 
worship, then x is all-powerful, all-knowing, and all-good (triple-A, for short). 
Many theists would affirm (ii), but by no means all. For example, Christians 
who accept a kenosis theory of the incarnation will think that the Son was worthy 
of worship even during the (roughly) thirty year period when He was not triple-A. 
I suggest that Social Trinitarians could hold that only God is triple-A, and that 
therefore the divine selves, taken individually, are not triple-A. I do not know 
of any scriptural passage that expressly forbids this.4 The Social Trinitarian might 
go on to hold that each divine self is worthy of worship, because of its status 
as an uncreated, eternal, morally perfect member of the Trinity. 
But how could the attributes be shared? Let's begin with omniscience. Earlier 
I quoted a statement in which Jesus says that the Son is ignorant of a certain 
truth. Most Christians would probably say that this ignorance was temporary 
and due to limitations inherent in the Son's incarnational state. But that is not 
the only way to take the verse. Why insist that the ignorance was due to the 
incarnation? One could even speculate that each of the three members of the 
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Trinity is less than omniscient, though their combined knowledge issues in 
omniscience. One could provide a very crude model for this as follows. Suppose 
there are as many true propositions as natural numbers. And suppose we imagine 
each true proposition assigned a natural number: 1, 2, 3, 4, .... The Father 
knows propositions 1, 4, 7, etc. The Son knows propositions 2, 5, 8, etc. The 
Holy Spirit knows propositions 3, 6, 9, etc. On this model, God would be 
omniscient, but none of the divine selves would be. Of course, it would be 
ridiculous to take this model as a likely account of divine knowledge.' The point 
is simply to suggest that it isn't obviously logically impossible that God should 
be omniscient even if the divine selves are not. 
In a similar vein, I see no reason why omnipotence couldn't be a shared 
attribute. What forces us to say that each divine person must be omnipotent? 
Why can't omnipotence result from some combination of the powers of the 
divine selves? It seems far from obvious that it's impossible for the divine powers 
to be shared in this way. 
Since worthiness of worship plainly requires moral pelfection on the part of 
each member of the Trinity, it may seem that there can be no piecemeal sharing 
of the components of divine goodness. However, one might think that certain 
gracious powers go beyond what is morally required to secure worthiness of 
worship. If so, these types of powers might be divided among the divine persons. 
That is, the Son might possess certain gracious powers lacked by the Spirit, the 
Father might possess certain gracious powers lacked by the Son, etc. 6 So, it is 
not at all clear that the critic can reach subconclusion (iv)-that there are three 
distinct selves who are each triple-A. 
C. Relations Between the Divine Persons 
Even granting that tritheism can be staved off by the Social Trinitarian, some 
will feel that the Social view posits a God that could "come unglued" entirely 
too easily. What (metaphysically) holds the divine persons together? Is God, on 
the Social view, no more permanent than the average committee? 
Probably there is no way for the Social Trinitarian to fully satisfy the confirmed 
Modalist on this score. But there are ways of supplementing the basic Social 
analogy that may remove some of the worries about God's "ontological fragility." 
First, we ought to think of the divine selves as utterly loyal to one another, 
as having a love for one another that far surpasses the best of human loves. If 
Anselm was right, it is a love than which no greater can be conceived. And the 
unity of the divine selves will be as permanent as this pelfect love. 
Second, we ought not suppose that the divine selves must gain indirect access 
to each other's internal states after the manner of human selves. (By 'internal 
states' I mean the divine analogues of thoughts, feelings, and volitions.) There 
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may be an immediate, "telepathic" awareness of internal states between the 
divine selves. Extensive inter-subjective access of this type would place the 
intimacy of the divine union in a category by itself, and would pour meaning 
into such cryptic biblical quotations as, "I and the Father are one" (John 10:30) 
and "If you had known me, you would have known my Father also" (John 14:7). 
In this paper I have put into the mouth of the Social Trinitarian replies to the 
charge of tritheism that raise important questions about God's nature and attri-
butes. But it is not my purpose in this paper to explore these issues in detail. 
My purpose has been the more limited one of defending the Social Trinitarian 
from a common criticism. If my arguments are correct, then Social Trinitarianism 
is not only logically coherent, but is also (contrary to common theological 
allegation) a form of monotheism. 
Seattle Pacific University 
NOTES 
I. All biblical quotations in this paper are from The Revised Standard Version of the Bible, Thomas 
Nelson and Sons, New York, 1952. 
2. Other biblical passages may give stronger support to the claim that the Son is eternal, e.g., John 
1:1-14 and Colossians 1:15-18. I stress the prayers of Jesus because they indicate that the Son is a 
distinct person from the Father. 
3. Of course, one may well find the very notion of substance puzzling, but I do not wish to press 
that point here. According to Aristotle, a thing x is a substance if x is a subject of predicates, but 
cannot be predicated in tum of any other subject. Alte.matively, x is a substance if x does not exist 
in a subject (where x "exists in" a subj~ct S if x cannot exist separately of S). Any individual human 
being is a substance according to Aristotle and so is any particular horse. See Aristotle's Categories 
and De interpretatione, trans. J. L. Ackrill (Oxford University Press, 1963). pp. 01-06. 
4. Interpreted literally, however, the Athanasian Creed does forbid this. It says, e.g., that each of 
the divine persons is omnipotent. But does orthodoxy require a strictly literal interpretation of the 
creeds in every case') It should be kept in mind that the Social Trinitarian can say that there are 
truths very close to "The Father is omnipotent," "The Son is omnipotent," etc. For given the unity 
of the divine wills, each divine self can draw on the power of the others. What religiously significant 
thing can an omnipotent person do that the Son (considered as less than omnipotent) cannot do with 
the help of the Father and the Spirit (assuming the Community of divine persons is omnipotent)? 
5. As it stands this crude model is no doubt inadequate. Presumably one would have to divide the 
knowledge up between the divine persons in some less arbitrary way-with an eye out for logically 
independent subject matters. My point here is not to provide an adequate model, but just to suggest 
a place to begin. 
6. Is there a hint of this possibility in Jesus words: " ... it is to your advantage that I go away, 
for if I do not go away, the Counselor [Holy Spirit] will not come to you .... And when he comes, 
he will convince the world of sin and of righteousness and of judgment" (John 16:7, 8)? 
